Articles
“A Political Economy of Aid,” (with Alastair Smith). International Organization. 63, 2 (Spring 2009):309-340.
“Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change,” (with Alastair Smith). Comparative Political Studies 42, 2 (February 2009): 167-197. Winner, 2008 Franklin L. Burdette/Pi Sigma Alpha Award for best paper presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Winner, 2007 Best Paper Award, Political Economy Section of the American Political Science Association.
“War and Rationality,” in Manus Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies III. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming 2009.
“Foreign Policy Analysis and Rational Choice Models,” in Compendium Project, International Studies Association, forthcoming 2009.
“Some Stylized Views of War’s Causes,” in Gregory Hess, ed., Title Not Yet Determined, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, forthcoming 2009.
“Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy,” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith). American Political Science Review 1022, 3 (August, 2008):pp. 393-400.
“Leopold II and the Selectorate: An Account in Contrast to a Racial Explanation,” Historical Social Research [Historische Sozialforschung], 32, 4 (2007): 203-221.
“Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions,” (with Alastair Smith). Journal of Conflict Resolution. 51 (April 2007): 251-284.
“Game Theory, Political Economy, and the Evolving Study of War and Peace,” American Political Science Review, (November, 2006):637-642.
“Intervention and Democracy,” (with George W. Downs) International Organization 60, 3 (July 2006):627-49.
“Complements in the Quest for Understanding Comparative Politics,” APSA-CP Newsletter 17 (Summer 2006):11-14.
“Selection Institutions and War Aims,” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith) Economics of Governance, 7, 1 (2006):31-52.
“Central Issues in the Study of International Conflict” in Barry Weingast and Donald Witman, eds. Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp.831-51.
“Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights,” (with Feryal Cherif, George W. Downs, and Alastair Smith) International Studies Quarterly. 49, 3 (September 2005):439-457. Reprinted in Todd Lanman, ed., Human Rights. Sage Publications: 2009.
“The Rise of Sustainable Autocracy,” (with George W. Downs). Foreign Affairs, 84, 5 (September/October 2005):77-86.
“Testing Competing Institutional Explanations of the Democratic Peace: The Case of Dispute Duration,” (with Michael T. Koch and Randolph M. Siverson) Conflict Management and Peace Science (Winter 2004), 255-68.
“Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War,” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith) World Politics 56 (April 2004), 363-88.
“The Methodical Study of Politics,” in Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, and Tarek E. Masoud, eds. Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 227-47.
“Negotiation in International Politics,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 (Fall 2004), 155-58.
“The ‘National Interest’ Versus Individual Political Ambition: Democracy, Autocracy, and the Reciprocation of Force and Violence in Militarized Interstate Disputes,” (with James Ray) in Paul Diehl, ed., The Scourge of War: New Extensions on an Old Problem. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2004, pp. 94-119.
“Decision Making Models, Rigor, and New Puzzles,” European Union Politics 2004, 5 (1):125-138.
“Crossing No Man’s Land: Cooperation from the Trenches,” (with Rose McDermott). 2004. Political Psychology 25, 2:271-287.
“Getting Firm on Replication,” International Studies Perspectives February 2003, Volume 4, pp. 98-100.
“Ruminations on Challenges to Prediction with Rational Choice Models,” Rationality and Society 2003, 15(1):136-47.
Neorealism’s Logic and Evidence: When is a Theory Falsified?” in Colin Elman and John Vasquez, eds. Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003, pp. 166-197.
“Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith) British Journal of Political Science 2002, 32,4:559-590.
“The Selectorate Model: A Theory of Political Institutions” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith) in Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch, eds., Contemporary Sociological Theories Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002, pp. 275-301.
“The Political Roots of Poverty” (with Hilton Root). 2002. The National Interest, 68: 27-38.
“Accomplishments and Limitations of a Game-Theoretic Approach to International Relations,” in Frank P. Harvey and Michael Brecher, eds. Evaluating Methodology in International Studies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002, pp. 59-80.
“Domestic Politics and International Relations,”International Studies Quarterly 46 (March 2002):1-9.
“Minimum Winning Coalitions, in Politics” International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral
Sciences. V. 3.11. Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2001.
“William Harrison Riker” (with Kenneth Shepsle) in Biographical Memoirs 79. National Academy Press, 2001.
“The Expected Prospects for Peace in Northern Ireland,” (with Rose McDermott and Emily Cope), International Interactions 2001 27,2:129-67.
“Political Survival and International Conflict,” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith) in Zeev Maoz and Azar Gar, eds. War in a Changing World. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001, pp. 183-206.
“Political Institutions and Incentives to Govern Effectively” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith) Journal of Democracy 12 (January 2001):58-72.
“Popes, Kings, and Endogenous Institutions: The Concordat of Worms and the Origins of Sovereignty,” International Studies Review pp. 93-118, Fall, 2000.
“Modeling the Number of United States Military Personnel Using Artificial Neural Networks,” (with Paul R. Williamson) Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy Journal 6:35-65, 2000.
“Reply to `Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick’” (with James D. Morrow and Ethan R. Zorick) American Political Science Review 94, 2 (June 2000):429.
“When Bad Economics is Good Politics,” (with Hilton L. Root) in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, eds. Governing for Prosperity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 1-16.
“Political Institutions, Political Survival, and Policy Success,” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith) in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, eds. Governing for Prosperity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 59-84.
“Improving the Effectiveness of Donor-Assisted Development,” (with Hilton L. Root) in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, eds. Governing for Prosperity. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 241-56.
“Political Instability as a Source of Growth,” Hoover Essays in Public Policy, No. 99, 2000.
“An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith), American Political Science Review 93(December 1999):791-807.
“Sorting Through the Wealth of Notions,” (with James D. Morrow) International Security 24,2 (Fall 1999):56-73. Reprinted in Rational Choice and Security Studies. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., pp. 45-62. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
“The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory,” (with S. M. Amadae) Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999):269-96.
“Policy Failure and Political Survival: the Contribution of Political Institutions” (with James D. Morrow, Randolph Siverson and Alastair Smith), Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43, 2 (April 1999):147-161.
“The End of the Cold War: Predicting an Emergent Property,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42,2 (April 1998):131-155. Reprinted in Twentieth Century International Relations, Michael Cox , ed. London: SAGE Publications, 2006.
“Making Security Studies Relevant to Policy Makers,” National Security Studies Quarterly, 3: 13-24, Autumn 1997.
“A Decision Making Model: Its Structure and Form” International Interactions 23: 235-66, 1997.
“Forecasting China’s Political and Economic Future,” (with Yi Feng) Problems of Post-Communism, 44,2 (March-April, 1997): 14-27.
“Capabilities, Perception and Escalation,” (with James Morrow and Ethan Zorick) American Political Science Review, 91, 1 (March, 1997): 15-27.
“Nasty or Nice?: Political Systems, Endogenous Norms, and the Treatment of Adversaries,” (with Randolph Siverson) Journal of Conflict Resolution 41,1 (February, 1997):175-199.
“North Korea under Kim Jong Il: Prospects for Economic Reform and Political Stability,” (with Jongryn Mo) in North Korea After Kim Il Sung, Thomas Henriksen, ed. Hoover Institution Press, 1997, pp. 13-31.
“Counterfactuals and International Affairs: Some Insights from Game Theory,” in P. Tetlock and A. Belkin, Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 211-29.
“North Korean Economic Reform and Political Stability,” (with Jongryn Mo) Hoover Essays in Public Policy, 1996.
“The Benefits of a Social-Scientific Approach to Studying International Affairs,” in Ngaire Woods, ed., Explaining International Affairs Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 49-76.
“The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1985-1993,” (with Joseph Lepgold and James Morrow) International Interactions 22 1996:41-66.
“War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability,” (with Randolph Siverson) American Political Science Review, December 1995. Reprinted in Randolph Siverson, ed. Strategic Politicians, Institutions, and Foreign Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998: pp. 225-286.
“Self Interest, Equity, and Crime Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Criminal Decision Making,” (with Lawrence E. Cohen) Criminology, (November 1995) 33:483-518.
“Beliefs about Power and the Risk of War: A Power Transition Game,” in Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke, eds. Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995, pp. 271-285.
“How Perceptions Influence the Risk of War,” (with Woosang Kim) International Studies Quarterly, March 1995:51-66.
“Assessing the Dispute in the South China Sea: A Model of China’s Security Decision Making,” (with Samuel S. G. Wu) International Studies Quarterly, September 1994:379-403.
“Power Relationships, Democratic Constraints and War,” (with David Lalman) in Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, eds., Reconstructing Realpolitik, pp. 161-181. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.
“Political Forecasting: An Expected Utility Method,” in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Frans Stokman, eds. European Community Decision Making. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, pp. 71-104.
“Policy Outcomes and Policy Interventions: An Expected Utility Analysis,” (with A.F.K. Organski) in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Frans Stokman, eds. European Community Decision Making. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, pp. 131-160.
“Models of Exchange and of Expected Utility Maximization: A Comparison of Accuracy,” (with Frans Stokman) in Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Frans Stokman, eds. European Community Decision Making. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, pp. 214-228.
“Terrorism or Peace in the Middle East?” The Journal of the Institute of Middle East Studies, Seoul, Korea, (1993) 12: 87-92.
“Forecasting the Risks of Nuclear Proliferation: Taiwan as an Illustration of the Method,” (with James Morrow and Samuel Wu) Security Studies, (Spring/Summer 1993) 2:311-331. Reprinted in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and What Results. London: Frank Cass, 1993.
“Forecasting the 1992 French Referendum,” (with A.F.K. Organski) in Roger Morgan, Jochen Lorentzen and Anna Leander, eds. New Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993, pp. 67-75.
“Domestic and International Imperatives in the Specification of Foreign Policy Objectives,” (with David Lalman) in William H. Riker, ed. Agenda Formation, pp. 127-50. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993.
“The Game of Conflict Interactions: A Research Program,” in Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditch, ed. Theoretical Research Programs: Studies in Growth of Theories of Group Process, pp. 139-71. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
“War and the Fate of Regimes: A Cross-National Analysis,” (with Randolph Siverson and Gary Woller) American Political Science Review (September, 1992), pp. 638-646.
“Pathways of Understanding: The Interactions of Humanity and Global Environmental Change,” (with William Kuhn, Urs Luterbacher, et al). Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network, 1992.
“A Mark in Time Saves Nein: An Illustration of a Forecasting Method Using Formal Models,” (with A.F.K. Organski) International Political Science Review (1992) 13:1, pp. 81-100.
“Prospects for a New Regional Order in Northeast Asia,” (with Chae-Han Kim) Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (Winter, 1991), pp. 65-82.
Democracy and Foreign Policy, Guest Editor (with Robert Jackman and Randolph Siverson), Journal of Conflict Resolution (June, 1991).
“Democracy and Foreign Policy: Introduction,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (June, 1991), pp. 181-186.
“Pride of Place: The Origins of German Hegemony,” World Politics 43 (October, 1990), pp. 28-52.
“Domestic Opposition and Foreign War,” (with David Lalman), American Political Science Review (September, 1990), pp. 747-765.
“Multilateral Negotiations: A Spatial Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Dispute,” International Organization (Summer, 1990), pp. 317-340. Reprinted in Korean Journal of Middle East Studies 44 (December, 1990).
“Big Wars, Little Wars: Avoiding Selection Bias,” International Interactions, 16, (1990), 159-169.
“La Scienza della Politica: è di Qualchè Aiuto al Politico Professionista?” Rivista Trimestrale di Scienza Dell’ Administrazione (no.3, 1989), pp.33-44.
“The Road to War is Strewn with Peaceful Intentions,” (with David Lalman) Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Peter Ordeshook, ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), pp. 253-266.
“The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict,” in M. Midlarsky, ed., The Handbook of War Studies, pp. 143-169. Winchester, Mass.: Unwin and Hyman, 1989.
“Dyadic Power, Expectations, and War,” (with David Lalman) in C. Gochman and A. Sabrosky, eds., Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modern Era. Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1990; pp. 161-176. Reprinted in Richard J. Stoll and Michael Don Ward, eds. Power in World Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, (1989), pp. 177-191.
“Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict,” (with David Lalman), World Politics 41 (October 1988), pp. 1-20.
“Threat and Alignment Behavior,” (with Grace Iusi Scarborough), International Interactions 14, 1 (1988), pp. 85-93.
“Arms Races and the Opportunity for Peace,” (with David Lalman), Synthese, 76, 2 (August, 1988) pp. 263-283.
“Expected Utility Theory and the Study of International Conflict,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, (Spring, 1988) pp. 629-652. Reprinted in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, eds. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 53-78.
“Conceptualizing War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (June, 1987), pp. 370-382.
“Modeling War and Peace,” (with David Lalman), American Political Science Review (March, 1987), pp. 227-230.
“A Catch to Moul’s Catch, Or Why Great Powers Act as Expected Utility Maximizers,” International Interactions (1987), pp. 177-181.
“Reason And War,” (with David Lalman), American Political Science Review, (December, 1986), pp. 1113-1131.
“Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View,” International Studies Quarterly (June, 1985), pp. 121-136.
“Reply to Stephen Krasner and Robert Jervis,” International Studies Quarterly (June, 1985), pp.
151-154.
“The War Trap Revisited,” American Political Science Review, (March, 1985), pp. 157-176.
“Forecasting Policy Decisions: An Expected Utility Approach,” (with Douglas Beck), in S. Andriole, ed., Corporate Crisis Management, Princeton, N.J.: Petrocelli Books, 1985, pp. 103-122.
“Theory and the Advancement of Knowledge About War,” Review of International Studies, (January, 1984) pp. 65-75.
“A Critique of `A Critique of The War Trap,’” Journal of Conflict Resolution (June, 1984), pp. 341-360.
“An Expected Utility Explanation of Conflict Escalation: A Preliminary Analysis,” in D. Zinnes, ed., Conflict Processes and the Breakdown of International Systems, Denver Monograph Series in World Affairs, University of Denver, Vol. 20, Book 2, 1983, pp. 47-60.
“Forecasting Policy Decisions: An Expected Utility Approach to Post-Khomeini Iran,” PS (Spring, 1984), pp. 226-236.
“A Dynamic Multiple-Goal Theory of Coalition Formation,” (with Richard G. Niemi), in M. Holler, ed., Coalitions and Collective Action. Wuerzburg, Germany: Physica-Verlag, 1984.
“The Costs of War: A Rational Expectations Approach,” American Political Science Review (June, 1983), pp. 347-357.
“Modeling the Initiation, Escalation, and Termination of Conflict,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 1983.
“Assessing the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation,” (with William H. Riker), Journal of Conflict Resolution (June, 1982), pp. 283-306.
“Risk, Power Distributions, and the Likelihood of War,” International Studies Quarterly (December, 1981), pp. 541-568.
“American Security and the Limits of Foreign Commitments,” (with Bruce D. Berkowitz), Comparative Strategy (Fall, 1981), pp. 245-261.
“National Decisions to Enter Wars,” (with Michael F. Altfeld), UMAP, Unit 394, 1981.
“An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict: An Exploratory Study,” American Political Science Review (December, 1980), pp. 917-931.
“Theories of International Conflict: An Analysis and An Appraisal,” in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., The Handbook of Political Conflict. New York: Free Press, 1980.
“Coalition Payoffs and Electoral Performance in European Democracies,” Comparative Political Studies (April, 1979), 61-81.
“Choosing Sides in Wars,” (with Michael F. Altfeld) International Studies Quarterly (March, 1979), pp. 87-112.
“Redistricting and Political Integration in India,” Comparative Political Studies (July, 1978), pp. 279-288.
“Systemic Polarization and the Occurrence and Duration of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (June, 1978), pp. 241-267. Reprinted in J. David Singer, ed., Explaining War. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1980.
International Relations Theory and International Politics: An Inquiry into Methodology, (with Gianfranco Pasquino). Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, Center for Mediterranean Studies, 1977.
“Measuring Systemic Polarity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (June, 1975), pp. 187-215.
“Need for Achievement and Competitiveness as Determinants of Political Success in Elections and Coalitions,” American Political Science Review (September, 1974), pp. 1207-1220.
“Alliances, Capabilities, and War: A Review and Synthesis,” (with J. David Singer), Political Science Annual. Vol. IV, pp. 237-280. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973.
“The Effective Population in International Politics,” (with A. F. K. Organski and Alan Lamborn) in R. Clinton, William Flash, and R. K. Goodwin, eds., Political Science in Population Studies. Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1972, pp. 79-100. Reprinted in A.E. Keir Nash, ed., Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Change. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 235-250. Translated into Italian.
“The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy” (with David Rohde). East Lansing: Michigan State University Kellogg Center, 1972.
“Common Sense Realism and Phenomenology, “ Social Science Review (May, 1967), pp. 29-37.